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Treaty of Amritsar march 16 1846

Treaty of Amritsar march 16 1846

Bhopinder Singh · 09 Jan 2006

Following is a article from Pakistan newspaper .It prooves how Dogras were rewarded for their treason of Sikhs (Gulab Singh) by British,also one thinks how a muslim majority state was given back to Hari Singh grandsom of Gulab Singh as soon as the British rule ended in 1947 by the same token it should have gone to decendents of sikh kingdom of 1849 in Punjab,not taking into consideration the populus just like Kashmir also you can see the mention of treaty of Amritsar. ___________________________________________________________J Treaty of Amritsar March 16 1846 By Tanvir Ahmad Khan NO less momentous than the dramatic change in Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan is the progressive scaling down of the commitment to the Kashmiri right of self-determination to whatever is embodied in the code-phrase ‘demilitarization and self-government’. Insofar as this shift reflects recognition of an adverse transformation of the international situation as well as the growing political, economic and military disparities in South Asia, this process is historically inevitable. Inherent in it, however, is the great challenge that it does not deliver the people of Kashmir into eternal slavery. On our side, there is very little articulation of either the new destination or the roadmap to it. If Pakistan was a working democracy, the foreign minister would have made a reasoned statement to the National Assembly, a task for which he is pre-eminently qualified. His spokesperson can do no better than retreat into the feeble alibi that important developments are taking place in the so-called secret diplomacy. All that we have is rather disconnected sound bytes from President Musharraf that run the risk of contradictory interpretations and that provide grist to the propaganda mills of his political opponents. Friends on the Indian side of the divide define the problem as New Delhi finding an acceptable ‘face-saving’ for the Pakistani leader. This formulation is shared by some of Pakistan’s top diplomats with several years of the experience of dealing with India. Basically, the current Kashmir diplomacy seems to have been reduced to discovering the modalities by which Kashmiri aspirations can be reconciled to some kind of autonomous existence within the Indian Union. I have myself argued in this space for an agreed period of autonomy on both sides of the Line of Control provided it is a prelude to a final settlement closer to the aims and objectives of the protracted struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. One of the best-informed American specialists on South Asia told me only a few days ago that the word “autonomy” would have to be replaced by some other word to make any tangible progress with India. Perhaps President Musharraf is mindful of the need to further dilute Kashmiri expectations by using “self-governance” instead of “autonomy” in his frequent pronouncements on the issue. The irony of thinking “out of the box” is that it, essentially, means going back to the box in which Sheikh Abdullah conceptualized the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Indian Union in the fateful years 1947-1953. Nehru sprung him out of jail and persuaded the maharaja, who had become the paramount ruler upon the lapse of British suzerainty, to make an order on October 30, 1947, to appoint him as the “head of administration”. A subsequent proclamation of the maharaja on March 5, 1948, elevated Abdullah to the status of prime minister. On August 8, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and imprisoned. During the intervening years, he struggled hard to hold Nehru to his commitment to honour the limited accession of the state to the Indian Union as contained in the so-called instrument of accession and as enshrined in what eventually became Article 370 of the Indian constitution. It is probably helpful to recall the salient features of this struggle as they provide important markers for a future dispensation based on “self-governance”. It must be recorded straightaway to President Musharraf’s credit that, unlike Sheikh Abdullah, he links this concept to demilitarization. India was able to incarcerate the lion of Kashmir for years because he had no control on the ultimate levers of power. The State Autonomy Committee set up by the Srinagar government in November 1996 (referred to hereafter as ‘the committee’) recalled in its report that at the time of the visit of the Cabinet Mission, the National _______Conference had demanded a total abrogation of the Treaty of Amritsar, “which was in the nature of a sale deed” executed with Gulab Singh on March 16, 1846._______ The restoration of full sovereignty to Indian princely states by the Independence Act of 1947 coincided with the suppression of a popular movement in the valley against Dogra tyranny. In many parts of the J&K state of 1947, there was a spontaneous uprising for close linkage with Pakistan. Direct intervention by the Pakistan army took place rather late in the day and considerable territorial gains made during the upsurge of the people were lost to the Indian military offensive of April 1948. Even so, the situation stabilized by the Pakistan army denied Azad Kashmir and the bulk of the Northern Areas to India. Azad Kashmir comprises 13,297 square kilometres and the Northern Areas another 72,496 sq. kms. India controls a total of 101,387 sq.kms of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. The maharaja’s instrument of accession, signed after the Indian troops had landed in Srinagar, conceded only foreign affairs, defence and communications to India. By 1949, Sheikh Abdullah was already engaged in difficult negotiations with New Delhi on Article 306-A (later Article 370) concerning powers of the Indian parliament to make laws for J&K territories. The committee referred to above noted that two important letters written by the Sheikh on October 12 and 15, 1949, on this subject were not available. He had strongly complained that pledges given to him were not being honoured. His letter of October 17, 1949, to Ayyangar, quoted in full by the committee, is a record of his failure to prevent a formulation that he instinctively realized could one day be used against him, as, indeed, it was in 1953. Article 370 still safeguarded the concept of a limited accession. It exempted J&K from the provisions of the Indian constitution for the governance of the states. It could have its own constitution within the Indian Union. The Indian parliament could legislate only on three subjects — foreign affairs, defence and communication. Any extension of other constitutional provisions would require not only the concurrence of the J&K state government but also ratification by the states’ own constituent assembly. The Autonomy Committee was of the opinion that “Article 370 cannot be abrogated or amended by recourse to the amending provisions of the (Indian) constitution which apply to the other states”, unless applied by order of the president of India under Article 370 itself that required “first the concurrence of the State government and subsequent ratification by its constituent assembly.” Nehru was too great a politician to consider the text of any agreement as eternally sacrosanct. This is what destroyed the British plan to create a zonal federation for transfer of power to a united India. The exchange of letters between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru in July 1952 on Article 370 probably made the Sheikh aware of this reality as on August 11, 1952, he asserted in the state constituent assembly, which he described as a sovereign body, that Article 370 could not be “abrogated, modified or replaced unilaterally”. “I would like to make it clear,” he thundered, “that any suggestion of altering arbitrarily this basis of our relationship with India would not only constitute a breach of the spirit and letter of the constitution but it may invite serious consequences for a harmonious association (my italics) of our state with India.” Sheikh Abdullah obviously considered his view to be the only valid interpretation of the Delhi agreement reached between him and Nehru on July 24, 1952. Events moved fast after Sheikh Abdullah’s imprisonment. New Delhi foisted puppets on Srinagar and initiated an endless process of eroding Article 370. The Indian constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 deviated from the instrument of accession as well as the Delhi Agreement. The committee listed 42 (Application to J&K amendment) orders between 1954 and 1986. It noted that out of 395 articles of the Constitution as many as 260 were applied to J&K, out of 97 entries in the Union list 94 were applicable, out of 47 entries in the concurrent list 26 were applied, and that seven out of 12 schedules had become applicable to J&K. The Autonomy Committee made important recommendations with a view to rehabilitating Article 370. “Designed to protect the state’s autonomy,” it concluded, “(Article 370) has been used systematically to destroy it. A compact is necessary between the Union and the State that Article 370 can no longer be used to apply to J&K any other provisions of the Constitution of India beyond the ones extended under 1950 order and the Delhi agreement, 1952.” The above narrative would be pedantic if Pakistan had not thrown its weight behind self-governance. It becomes highly relevant to any future negotiations between India and Pakistan and between their governments and the representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. There are international precedents for settlement on the basis of autonomous association or partnership — both words borrowed from Sheikh Abdullah’s lexicon — but in all of them autonomy is inviolable. Prof Abdul Ghani Bhat has told an English language daily of Lahore that radical changes in global politics have affected the Kashmir freedom struggle and that the Kashmiri youth would have to adjust their outlook. The APHC’s shift to realpolitik is understandable but neither Pakistan nor the APHC can dispense with the responsibility of making the best possible deal for future generations. So far as the areas that liberated themselves in 1947 — the freedom of which has been defended with the blood of Pakistani soldiers for 58 years — are concerned, there has to be even greater caution. I have recounted the tragic history of the autonomy for which Sheikh Abdullah spurned Pakistan only with a view to emphasizing the need for much greater vigilance in the days ahead. I hope to devote the next article to my understanding of this vigilance. I have no doubt in my mind that if, for any reasons, we cannot exercise it today, we should leave it to another time and to another government. Pakistan cannot be in the business of selling yet another mirage to a people who have buried 70,000 martyrs. Realism does not mean abdication of all moral responsibility. The writer is a former foreign secretary.